The conservative bloc won, the socialist bloc survived, the far-right blocs rose, and the rest collapsed. This, in a nutshell, is the result of the European elections. Or to put it more harshly: the latest elections went down like the screech of a knife on a china plate.
The historic winner of the 2024 European Parliament elections is voter abstention. Many voters do not perceive the real influence of the European Parliament in federal decision-making, since the voice of the Council of State Leaders, expressed through the Commission’s balances, often dominates. European elections are usually a popular and enthusiastic arena for fringe parties, populist candidates, and cynical or anti-political blocs. Their voting law, which treats each country as a single constituency, allows these lists to bypass the constraints of national electoral laws that are often designed to facilitate majority formation and set high thresholds for marginal parties. As a result, voter behavior in European elections is usually more reckless, emotional, extremist, and more inclined to punish local politicians than in national elections. In national elections, voters feel their vote has a greater influence on the direct authority over them, and the calculations of “useful” voting play a significant role in their decision-making. Keeping this in mind, we should beware of trying to automatically translate the results of the European elections into the national reality of each member state
Having said this, there are clear conclusions from last night’s results and the previous election campaign:
Firstly, the far right is on the rise. The European elections have caused an earthquake in both France and Germany. In France, Marine Le Pen continues her dramatic ascent, improving her position and imposing herself on her opponents to the point that stopping her has become their primary message. Immediately after the initial projections were announced, Macron dissolved the Parliament and called for legislative elections – a tactical move which, whether it succeeds or fails, cannot hide the strategic vacuum. In Germany, despite a difficult few weeks, Alternative for Germany (AfD) outperformed all the ruling coalition parties, achieving second place nationally behind a Christian Democratic party that has shifted to the right. The far right also won in Austria, and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party secured another victory in Hungary, where defections from the ruling party alone yielded better results than all the opposition combined. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni has risen to the forefront of politics in a country that has seen its elites under fire in recent decades.
Secondly, centrist blocs are holding up (to some extent, for the time being). The conservative bloc has strengthened its lead. The Social Democrats have maintained a good share – despite the poor performance of the German Socialists – thanks to acceptable results in the countries of the South and North. Despite significant losses for the liberal and green blocs, the numbers suggest there is still a sufficient majority to maintain the basic features of the status quo in the federal scales. Recent weeks have been filled with rumors of French maneuvers striking a deal to replace Ursula von der Leyen as head of the Commission with Italian technocrat Mario Draghi, but Macron’s disappointment leaves a broad horizon for von der Leyen’s renewal in the position. Von der Leyen may remain President of the Commission, but with a spirit and rhetoric completely opposite to the consensus that first brought her to the role. Once carrying the standard of isolating the far right in opposition to her “frenemies” in the conservative bloc, she has recently been acting as if she were the president of the Giorgia Meloni Fan Club, a nostalgic admirer of Mussolini in Italy.
Thirdly, the political landscape has shifted to the right. Not that the far right has won entirely – while it has made significant advances, it has not achieved overall victory and remains divided, with fundamental conflicts among its factions. What has triumphed is the radical shift of the entire framework of political debate to the right, particularly concerning issues of identity, immigration and asylum, and Islamophobia. The German left coalition performed poorly compared to the “Conservative left” faction led by Sarah Wagenknecht, who places anti-immigration sentiment at the core of her rhetoric and electoral programs. This faction not only doubled the results of the parent coalition but also surpassed the Liberal Party, a partner in the federal government. This shift exemplifies the current general zeitgeist of European politics.
Fourthly, the Greens have collapsed. The poor outcome of green parties in Europe highlights the difficulty of forming a strong green political bloc. Despite the fact that the climate crisis is visible to the naked eye and that public environmental awareness has significantly increased in recent years, we see a major setback in these elections. This follows a series of important political advances over the past decade, culminating in the successes of the Green Party in Germany. No doubt, the controversial stance of the German Greens regarding the Israeli war on Gaza has significantly damaged the popularity of European environmental parties, especially among youth and those with immigrant backgrounds. This damage is difficult to reverse.
Regarding the impact of these general European political trends on our Syrian context, we can say two things. Firstly, there is no indication – either from these elections, with their limited impact, or from the behavior and statements of European diplomats – that there will be a significant European political shift regarding Syria. It is likely we will continue to see the current downward path, focusing on agreements and deals to prevent refugees from traveling to Europe and to deport as many as possible, while neglecting any political issues related to Syria as a country.
Secondly, a significant bloc of the Syrian diaspora has been able to vote after obtaining European citizenship. There are no clear statistics or opinion polls regarding the behavior of this electoral bloc, but observations indicate that voter turnout was not high. However, there are two trends in Syrian interaction with the European electoral event that deserve study: the involvement of many young Syrians in supporting anti-Israel parties (such as MeRA25, the German branch of Yanis Varoufakis’ party), positively integrating with the Gaza moment despite potential concerns regarding these parties’ positions on the Syrian issue; and the intense debate sparked by the candidacy of Rima Hassan, an activist of Palestinian-Syrian origins, on La France Insoumise’s list. Her candidacy caused anger among part of the politicized Syrian public in France and abroad due to her muted stance on the Assad regime – and her recent visit to Syria.
Where and how do we place Syria when we engage in politics in the diaspora? With which allies and against which opponents? These are the central questions for the present and future of the Syrian issue.
