Smuggling from Syria into Jordan has become so commonplace that it often goes unnoticed. However, occasional incidents stand out and shed light on significant details worthy of attention. One such incident happened in May, and revealed that the individual behind a recent drug shipment (which had led to the deaths of several smugglers) had been detained by the regime only one month earlier.
This is not your typical Hollywood plot, where a drug kingpin runs his empire from the shadows of a prison cell. The twist is as straightforward as it is alarming: the dealer simply bought his way out of jail and wasted no time slipping seamlessly back into the illicit trade.
Importantly, this is not an isolated incident. It underscores how the Syrian regime has exploited crackdowns on drug dealers to serve multiple agendas while ensuring the flow of illicit drugs remains unabated.
A New Era of “Cooperation”
A year has passed since the Syrian regime’s readmission to the Arab League, accompanied by a plan led by an Arab Liaison Committee to combat drug trafficking from Syria, among other issues. Since then, the regime has frequently announced drug dealer arrests within its territories, ostensibly showcasing its commitment to the war on drugs.
These announcements, often framed as part of a broader security campaign against drug trafficking, often very conveniently coincide with coordination meetings with Arab states on the matter.
Illustrating this strategy is the case of Ahmed al-Sheikha, a prominent drug dealer from As-Suwayda who was detained on April 10th. His arrest happened just before a scheduled meeting with the Arab Liaison Committee in Baghdad on May 7, where drug trafficking from Syria was a key agenda item. It also preceded the Arab League summit in Manama the same month, which Assad attended. However, just two weeks after the arrest announcement, reports surfaced that the regime had released al-Sheikha after he paid over $80,000 for his freedom.
Detention for the purpose of extortion has been increasingly prevalent in Syria for years. The release of drug dealers in exchange for money suggests that the primary aim of such arrests is not solely to send political messages. Discussions with sources within regime-controlled areas reveal that the practice of releasing drug traffickers for payment is prevalent, even when extortion is not the primary motive for their arrest. This trend is nowhere more apparent than when detained drug traffickers, whether caught red-handed or during trafficking attempts, manage to secure their release by buying their liberty.
Media Stunts and Inflated Numbers
Beyond scoring political points and engaging in extortion, the Syrian regime uses detention to assert its authority over illicit trade within regime-controlled networks and intimidate those who do not comply with its demands. This is particularly evident when regime-linked drug dealers are involved in the crackdowns.
For instance, in May 2023, security forces raided the Al-Salem compound in Kharab Al-Shahm, owned by known drug dealer Hamad Mahawish al-Khalidi, resulting in two arrests. That same week, the regime raided a farm near Maaraba village owned by suspected drug trafficker Rafi Ruwais, leading to two more arrests. These operations were orchestrated by military security units under the command of Imad Abu Zreik, who has been sanctioned by the USA for his involvement in drug trafficking.
In stark contrast, the regime continues to offer protection to publicly known narcotics kingpins such as Samer Kamal al-Assad, Wassim al-Assad, or Noah Zaiter, allowing them to operate freely in regime-controlled Syria. This highlights, yet again, the regime’s reluctance to curb the supply of narcotics to the wider region.
Reports also indicate that the regime has exaggerated the number of arrests to amplify the significance of its anti-drug operations. For instance, in September 2022, Brigadier General Nidal Jreij, the director of the Syrian Drug Control Department, claimed that the regime’s counter-narcotics efforts in the first nine months of that year led to the arrest of 851,621 individuals on narcotics-related charges – a figure equivalent to nearly 15% of Syria’s adult population.
The regime provided no specific details regarding the locations of these arrests, the profiles of the detainees, the quantities of drugs seized, or the legal proceedings that followed – a lack of transparency further undermines the credibility of these figures. Additionally, monitoring reports from the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reveal that only 343 people were reported arrested on drug-related charges during the same period, highlighting a monumental discrepancy.
While the regime has announced the launch of multiple anti-drug campaigns, many of these have been dismissed as mere media stunts, since they yielded few, if any, substantial arrests. As an example, a security campaign was announced last July, following a meeting in Amman aimed at coordinating anti-drug efforts between Syrian army and security offices and their Jordanian counterparts. Despite the high-profile nature of the campaign, it reportedly failed to result in the arrest of a single drug dealer.
As the regime escalates its announcements of crackdown operations against drug traffickers, recent on-the-ground monitoring conducted by the Syrian organization Etana uncovers a concerning pattern: there has actually been a significant spike in cross-border smuggling attempts from Syria. The number has more than tripled since the last smuggling season (which usually lasts from October to March. In the 2024 season, Etana documented 282 smuggling attempts, a marked increase from the 108 recorded in the previous season.
For all its pretenses, the Assad regime continues to serve as the main supplier of Captagon. This fact is evident in its superficial drug crackdowns, which serve as little more than a façade, not as a genuine attempt to tackle the issue. As a result, the data and actions reported from these initiatives lack credibility and must undergo thorough independent evaluation. Accepting these figures at face value perpetuates the regime’s deceptive tactics and fails to tackle the root of Syria’s growing narcotic problem – the regime itself.
