The clashes between tribal militants and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Deir ez-Zor in August 2023 were not unexpected to those closely monitoring the situation in the region, as it had been rapidly deteriorating. However, what Deir ez-Zor experienced, and continues to experience, cannot be simply reduced to a tribal rebellion that flared up briefly and resurfaced a year later with overt support from the regime and its allies. Nor should it be overstated as an Arab-Kurdish conflict that has driven the region to a point of no return. Regardless, it remains a significant indicator of the region’s potential to descend into violence at any time.
After several days of fighting last year, the SDF regained control of all areas, despite an announcement by Ibrahim al-Hafl, the brother of the leader of al-Uqaydat – one of Syria’s largest tribes Sheikh Musab al-Hafl succeeded his father, Sheikh Khalil Abboud al-Jadaan al-Hafl, as the leader of the al-Uqaydat tribe. Due to his residence in Qatar, Sheikh Musab entrusted his younger brother, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hafl, with managing the tribe’s affairs in Syria until his return. Sheikh Ibrahim is based in the family stronghold in the town of Dhiban, located east of Deir ez-Zor and under the control of the Autonomous Administration. The al-Hafl family traditionally holds the leadership of the al-Uqaydat tribe, with the descendants of Jadaan al-Hafl responsible for overseeing the tribe’s affairs. – regarding the formation of a “tribal army” to continue the struggle. For more information, see Justice for Life (2017), Tribal Members in Deir ez-Zor: From Stability to Revolution, Conflict Dynamics, and Factors of Civil Peace. Accessed June 25, 2024. This declaration did not impact the daily lives of residents, especially given the absence of rebel tribal leaders from their areas as they relocated to regions controlled by the Syrian regime.
A full year after the initial confrontation, in the early days of August 2024, armed men claiming allegiance to tribal forces launched attacks on villages under the control of the SDF. These attacks originated from areas held by the Syrian regime and Iranian militias, supported by elements within the targeted areas. This large-scale offensive confirmed the Syrian regime and its allies, particularly Iran, The Iranian side is most often accused in the current movements, given the regional tension and recent events impacting Tehran and its allies in multiple Middle Eastern countries, as well as the significant presence of militias affiliated with Iran in regime-controlled areas east of Deir ez-Zor. were exploiting the tribal rebellion that occurred a year earlier and using it strategically against their opponents.
The SDF’s takeover in 2017 and the establishment of governing bodies marked a new chapter for Deir ez-Zor, especially following the harsh years under the Islamic State (ISIS), which deprived the region of education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid, while subjecting it to extreme violence and repression, exemplified by the al-Shaitat massacres.
This article examines the tensions that arose in the Autonomous Administration-controlled areas of Deir ez-Zor during the summer of 2023. It aims to identify the causes, trace the development and outcomes of these tensions, and analyze them. The article reviews efforts to contain the crisis and find solutions, drawing on observations and the initiatives of civil society leaders. It maintains a neutral stance, not favoring either side of the confrontation, and considers the involvement of other parties – particularly the Syrian government, Iran, and Turkey – as secondary factors that, while significant, do not fully explain the underlying tensions. These interventions have, however, exacerbated the complexity and severity of the situation in the Syrian Jazira region. The article aims to highlight the root causes of the tension and crisis and concludes by offering perspectives on possible solutions.
Deir ez-Zor before August 2024
Deir ez-Zor began to recover after ISIS was expelled by the SDF and the international coalition led by the United States. Following this, civilian councils, service committees, and security committees were established to oversee “restoration” efforts and manage the security situation.
The Autonomous Administration facilitated the work of civil organizations by granting licenses to operate in its controlled areas, which led to a flow of financial support into the region. This support was distributed among Autonomous Administration committees and local and international organizations. However, over time, the services provided failed to meet expectations for three main reasons. Firstly, the infrastructure had been severely damaged during the war. Secondly, the authorities responsible for providing services, including the Autonomous Administration committees and organizations, were unable to deliver these services consistently and equitably to all citizens and regions; this failure was due to a lack of experience, favoritism, and widespread corruption. Thirdly, the security situation deteriorated, Justice for Life (2021), Deir ez-Zor: Growing Local Fears Following a Series of Incidents Resulting from “Security Chaos”. Accessed May 20, 2024. as the security and military forces responsible for maintaining order in Deir ez-Zor were unable to prevent this decline in the years leading up to last year’s confrontation.
Given the weak results of stabilization efforts, the people of Deir ez-Zor began comparing the governorate’s service and security conditions post-ISIS with those in other areas under Autonomous Administration control. A study by the Justice for Life Organization, titled “Citizen Participation in Local Administration”, highlighted discrepancies in the performance of Autonomous Administration institutions across different regions. The study noted “inconsistencies in the work of official institutions from one area to another, with no clear consensus on the cause of these disparities.” Some factors, the study added, may include “lack of competence, personal interests, the influence of money, certain tribes, and powerful individuals, as well as insufficient allocation of resources to meet each region’s needs.”
Several local events contributed to this comparison, including the imposition of an expatriate card on some residents of the Syrian Jazira, the spread of robbery and looting gangs, and violations against civilians, Syrians for Truth and Justice (2022), Northeastern Syria: Documenting Cases of Torture and Ill-Treatment of Detainees. Accessed May 21, 2024. such as arbitrary arrests and imprisonment without trial. Deir ez-Zor also recorded high cholera cases compared to other areas, exacerbated by the Autonomous Administration’s difficulty in ensuring access to clean water. Additionally, the introduction of educational curricula that many considered contrary to local culture added to the discontent.
Beyond these service-related challenges, the local community’s trust in the Autonomous Administration has been further eroded by the uncertainty surrounding its negotiations with the Syrian regime. The lack of transparency about the security arrangements that might emerge from these negotiations, and the potential impact on many areas and the future of hundreds of security-prosecuted activists, has fueled anxiety. Moreover, there are concerns about the economic repercussions for the region if an agreement is reached with the Syrian regime, which is subject to economic sanctions that could extend to any areas under its control. The Autonomous Administration has repeatedly emphasized that its talks with the Damascus government prioritize the security and interests of the residents in its territories and that the negotiations “serve the interests of Syria and its people.” The problem is not the communication itself, especially since the SDF-controlled areas in the Syrian Jazira face significant challenges, such as difficulties in movement between these areas and regime-controlled regions, an education crisis affecting tens of thousands of students, and challenges in obtaining identification documents. Thus, these negotiations could offer an opportunity to address these issues in ways that ease daily life for residents. They could also help reduce tensions between the two areas of control and pave the way for future comprehensive national-level negotiations. However, the main concern lies in the lack of information about the ongoing negotiations and their potential impact on the security and future of the residents.
For several years, representatives of the people of Deir ez-Zor, including community leaders, local organizations, and activists, have voiced their discontent with the conditions in the region through peaceful means, such as popular demonstrations, strikes, and online advocacy campaigns. The security forces responded to these movements by either ignoring them or suppressing and threatening the participants, though they refrained from using excessive violence.
In August 2023, the “strengthening security” campaign marked a turning point in Deir ez-Zor. The SDF removed Ahmed al-Khbeil, also known as Abu Khawla, the leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, blaming him for the deterioration of security conditions and for committing violations against civilians. The dismissal statement cited “reports and complaints from the people” as the reason for this decision. The decision also included the removal of four other leaders of the Deir ez-Zor Council. The SDF promised that this move would signal the start of a new phase, during which the governorate would see significant improvements across all areas in a short time.
Syrian Democratic Forces and Deir ez-Zor tribes
The relationship between the SDF and the tribes of Deir ez-Zor has remained unstable since the former extended its control over the areas north of the Euphrates River. This instability is evident in the campaigns led by the dismissed commander of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council against long-standing and influential tribal leaders, which involved defamation and attempts to manipulate tribal positions. Despite these tensions, the relationship between the two sides fluctuated between periods of escalation and calm without escalating into a direct confrontation. Although the former Military Council leader sought to disrupt tribal balances by leveraging his military power and significant financial support, tribal leaders generally maintained a balanced response and refrained from violence up until August 2023. This restraint can be attributed to two main factors: first, the desire to avoid new confrontations that could be difficult to resolve, and second, the belief that the actions of the Military Council commander were temporary and would eventually dissipate. A key example of this cautious approach was the response to the assassination of Mutashar al-Hamoud al-Hafl, one of the most prominent leaders of al-Uqaydat tribe, Many activists and tribal notables were assassinated in previous years, leading to accusations that representatives of the Syrian Democratic Forces in Deir ez-Zor were responsible for the security chaos. For more information, see Justice for Life (2020), Repercussions of Fragile Stability and Human Rights Violations. Accessed June 22, 2024. which Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hafl survived. The tribal reaction was limited to a gathering of thousands at al-Uqaydat tribe’s guesthouse, where they emphasized their ability to protect themselves and influence the region, without directly blaming anyone.
Through this controlled escalation, the tribes aimed to send a message that they were capable of mobilization. Their actions highlighted the significant distance between the SDF leadership, particularly its representatives in Deir ez-Zor, and the tribal leaders, indicating that the factors driving conflict outweighed those fostering consensus.
In addition to the points mentioned, it’s important to examine the SDF’s relationships with the key tribal leaders in Deir ez-Zor. It can be said that the SDF failed to leverage its presence to strengthen its ties with the tribes. Instead, its strategy was dominated by a clientelist approach, which was ultimately proven ineffective by the events in Deir ez-Zor, even before the crisis in August 2023. This failure was evident in two ways: first, the SDF’s tribal allies were unable to improve the performance of administrative institutions for the benefit of the local population, and second, they failed to restore calm after the outbreak of the armed tribal rebellion. Moreover, the SDF missed the opportunity to build a balanced relationship based on trust and continuous consultation with influential tribal leaders, despite the local approval it received after driving out ISIS. Instead, it allowed local military leaders, driven by their ambitions for power and influence, to interfere with these relationships, inevitably leading to conflict.
The impact of internal SDF conflicts on escalating tensions
Last summer’s rebellion, which coincided with the dismissal of Deir ez-Zor Military Council’s commander, was likely unplanned, particularly since his removal had been a key demand of all local forces. His dismissal was seen as beneficial to the tribal leaders who had been engaged in an undeclared conflict with him, as previously mentioned.
However, the armed confrontations between the SDF and its affiliates – who opposed Ahmed al-Khbeil’s dismissal and were members of the tribes – gradually escalated, leading to civilian casualties and road blockages in several villages. These events appeared to be the pivotal moment that some tribal leaders had been waiting for to reclaim their prestige and restore the symbolic authority they had lost due to the actions of the dismissed commander, Abu Khawla. This intent was evident in the statements from tribal leaders, who distanced themselves from Abu Khawla, emphasizing that any actions they took were in support of the families and victims, not in defense of a soldier who had defied his command. They issued specific demands for restoring calm, viewing the conflict between the SDF and the Military Council as an internal matter that did not concern them. The tribal leaders’ demands aligned with the local grievances expressed by the people over the years, particularly regarding the management of the region and its resources. This alignment can be seen as an effort by the tribal leaders to restore respect and reinforce their status by demonstrating their ability to protect their tribesmen.
The tribal leaders’ messages rapidly evolved into a call for general mobilization against the SDF, rejecting any dialogue with them, holding them responsible for the deterioration of the situation in Deir ez-Zor, and insisting on negotiating exclusively with the international coalition.
On the other hand, the SDF initially showed a clear desire to avoid expanding the confrontations by withdrawing its forces from major populated areas and regrouping them elsewhere. The SDF continued to emphasize that its security operation was exclusively targeting what it called outlaw elements. This approach can be attributed to two main reasons: first, the International Coalition and the SDF were reluctant to escalate confrontations with the tribes, as this could increase hostility towards them. Second, the SDF did not anticipate a sudden escalation from the tribes, especially since it believed that the dismissal of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council commander was in response to local demands. Therefore, the SDF preferred to avoid further clashes.
As the confrontations intensified, the SDF accused the tribal movement of collaborating with the Damascus government, claiming that the movement’s leaders, particularly the brother of the leader of al-Uqaydat tribe, Ibrahim al-Hafl, were receiving orders and funding directly from Syrian security services. Consequently, the SDF felt compelled to confront this movement as part of its “duty to prevent external interference”, a sentiment echoed by many political activists and tribal notables who noted that the Damascus regime attempted to inflame the crisis and offered direct support to the rebellion.
The tribes’ announcement of a general mobilization, their control over many areas in the eastern and northern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, and the SDF’s decision to continue its military response as the only option to regain control, sparked violent military confrontations that Deir ez-Zor had not seen since the end of military operations against ISIS in 2019. As usual, civilians bore the brunt of these confrontations, with dozens killed and wounded, and significant material damage incurred.
The third stance
Contrary to what is commonly perceived, positions in Deir ez-Zor during the crisis were not solely divided between supporting the armed tribal rebellion and backing the SDF’s response, as was portrayed by the media and certain social media accounts. A third stance emerged among several civil society organizations and local notables. This stance was built on two main pillars: first, the outright rejection of using weapons to resolve the crisis, with the aim of preserving lives and property and avoiding the descent into violence, while emphasizing that dialogue is the only path to a long-term solution. The second pillar was the belief that any solution should address the underlying security, service, and economic problems facing Deir ez-Zor, which those holding this view saw as the root causes of the crisis. They argued that the armed actions by some groups in the region were not the primary issue.
This perspective was initially expressed through scattered statements, but within days it crystallized into several initiatives – seven in total – proposed by political and civil activists, groups, and organizations. These initiatives were presented to both the leadership of the SDF and the tribal leaders, offering an analysis of the causes of the current situation and proposing demands that the proponents believed could lead to a lasting resolution of the crisis.
However, this position did not receive sufficient attention amid the mutual exchange of accusations between the two opposing sides. Moreover, those advocating for dialogue and rejecting armed confrontations faced widespread defamation on social media and in the media. The focus and mobilization remained centered on calls for violence, and there was little confidence in the effectiveness of civil initiatives or those leading them among local actors – whether tribal leaders, SDF commanders, or international actors such as American officials involved in the northern and eastern Syria file.
Not all initiatives were publicly announced. Some were circulated widely on social media, while those behind the “Civil Initiative/Roadmap for Dialogue in Deir ez-Zor” chose to keep their initiative flexible to adapt to the rapidly changing military and political landscape. They aimed to build consensus by presenting it for discussion among civil organizations, the Autonomous Administration/SDF, and several tribal leaders, rather than making direct demands. The “Civil Initiative/Roadmap for Dialogue in Deir ez-Zor” focused on establishing a multilateral and transparent dialogue process involving civil society organizations, clans, and the Autonomous Administration, in partnership with local actors.
This third position influenced the Autonomous Administration to focus on the local demands outlined in the initiatives, which were reflected in the outcomes of the “Enhancing Security and Stability” conference held by the Autonomous Administration in October 2023. Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (2023), “With a Set of Outcomes… The Civil Administration of Deir ez-Zor Holds a Conference to Enhance Security and Stability in Deir ez-Zor”. Accessed June 19, 2024. The efforts of these initiatives to engage local stakeholders and achieve consensus also encouraged foreign diplomatic missions involved in the Syrian file to advocate for credible dialogue to resolve the crisis in Deir ez-Zor. Most importantly, these initiatives helped curb the spread of racist rhetoric, particularly in the governorates of Deir ez-Zor and al-Hasakah.
The civil initiatives, along with the calls from many community leaders that coincided with them, highlighted significant developments in political and social awareness in Deir ez-Zor. These developments can be summarized as follows:
– First, a categorical rejection of returning to war, drawing lessons from the previous years of conflict and its repercussions;
– Second, the need to clarify the role of tribal leaders and define the relationship between them and the Autonomous Administration, as the overemphasis on the role of tribal leaders in recent years has negatively impacted the already strained governance bodies;
– Third, the recognition that organized and sustained local participation is essential for any future resolution of tension/crisis, a realization born out of the tragic experiences of war.
The introduction of these initiatives was not without internal challenges, the most significant being competition among those leading the initiatives and the similarity of the demands they contained, raising questions about the need for multiple initiatives with largely the same content. However, this issue was addressed through in-depth discussions among the initiative leaders.
Restructuring efforts by the Autonomous Administration
The Autonomous Administration initiated intensive dialogues immediately after calm was restored to the Deir ez-Zor region. These discussions were led by civilian and military officials and included tribal leaders, representatives of civil organizations, influential figures, and politicians. The focus was on identifying the causes of the tension and exploring ways to resolve them. According to many participants, the dialogues were marked by frankness, with several attendees attributing the poor conditions in the governorate to the inadequate performance of Autonomous Administration institutions in Deir ez-Zor. They also called for the fulfillment of the restructuring and reform promises that the administration had made years earlier.
As a result of these dialogues, the Autonomous Administration held a conference on October 22, 2023, titled “Enhancing Security and Stability in Deir ez-Zor”. The conference was attended by Autonomous Administration officials and community leaders and concluded with numerous pledges that reflected the outcomes of the preceding dialogues.
In the months following the conference, a series of appointments and dismissals were made, affecting the Civil Council of Deir ez-Zor and its affiliated committees, such as those overseeing health and agriculture. The Legislative Council in the governorate, which had been inactive in previous years, was also reconstituted. The new appointments aimed to place individuals with good reputations and competence in key positions within the Autonomous Administration institutions. However, the appointments were made using the same previous mechanisms, relying on focused consultations with tribal leaders and a distribution of positions among the clans.
Several observations can be made regarding these high-level dialogues and their outcomes:
– Officials in the Autonomous Administration insisted on leading the dialogue, positioning the administration as both opponent and arbiter, which may have compromised the impartiality of the process.
– In the restructuring process that emerged from the dialogue, the Autonomous Administration continued to use the same appointment methods, favoring the principle of tribal quotas. In fact, it even strengthened this approach to gain more favor with the tribes following the rebellion that had caused significant tension in the region. This method of appointment, particularly given the current circumstances in Deir ez-Zor, exacerbates tribal divisions and deepens the involvement of the SDF in these divisions.
– The administration did not provide the newly appointed officials with any practical guarantees that they would have full authority to implement the desired reforms. Additionally, the Autonomous Administration has yet to address the restructuring of the security and military forces.
– Despite the restructuring decisions, the Autonomous Administration called for municipal elections without explaining the rationale for limiting elections to municipalities or why the principle of election was not applied to the leadership of the civil and legislative councils. Furthermore, the administration postponed the election date twice, with the second postponement occurring without setting a new date. The previously mentioned study, titled “Citizen Participation in Local Administration,” indicated that “the current conditions are not conducive to holding elections that meet the standard of integrity” and stressed that “it is important not to hold elections at this time because they will not result in meaningful change in either form or performance.”
Outcomes
After a year of tension in Deir ez-Zor, the efforts of civil organizations and the Autonomous Administration highlight two key outcomes: first, the validity of the stance against violence and the insistence on multilateral dialogue, correctly identifying the root of the problem as stemming from long-standing administrative and security neglect. The second outcome is the recognition of division – both within the Autonomous Administration itself and among those managing the Syrian Jazira file in certain foreign diplomatic missions. There are two prevailing currents: one advocates for swift and decisive action in response to demands, while the other is willing to make changes only if they do not undermine the authority of political, security, and influential community forces.
The control exercised by the SDF and the governance bodies formed in Northern and Eastern Syria, coupled with a relatively greater degree of freedom compared to previous regimes, presents an opportunity to improve the functioning of service institutions and, consequently, the daily lives of the population. Achieving this requires, above all, building trust between these bodies and local communities. This trust begins with a genuine commitment to the principle of involving local representatives in the management of civil councils at the governorate level and in the political representation of the region. To do so, the Autonomous Administration must undertake a comprehensive review of its approach to managing and providing services in the areas under its control, as well as its relationship with political and civil forces at the national level.
A starting point could be adopting a flexible concept of self-administration that delivers services without discrimination, under the supervision of transparent institutions, and capable of sustaining itself amid regional and international complexities and shifting political stances toward Syria. This concept should empower citizens to manage their regions and choose their representatives within its institutions, removing any rigidity in its administrative methods and political discourse. With this approach, self-administration can become a protective framework that serves the best interests of the region’s residents.
The recent armed attacks in Deir ez-Zor underscore that a comprehensive approach to managing the Syrian Jazira regions and representing them politically is the only viable way to protect these areas and transform them into one of the few remaining beacons of hope in the country. This approach will ensure they remain an indispensable factor in any political solution, regardless of the regional and international political challenges.
