In the current Syrian political discourse, the term “early recovery” has been used increasingly to refer to various, often vague, concepts, with its meaning largely dependent on who is using the term and their intentions. This ambiguity is what makes the term so attractive and powerful. The regime, opposition, donors, governmental and non-governmental organisations alike can use it to point to different things. The term offers its users flexible boundaries, which can be continually shifted to describe activities that fall within or outside the scope of humanitarian aid. Since the term is technical, belonging to the language of donors and NGOs, it doesn’t greatly serve academia, yet it has proven highly effective in the political realm. At particular moments, depending on its purpose and manner of use, the term can even become a dangerous weapon, threatening the overlooked rights of the most vulnerable groups, such as refugees and forcibly displaced persons, particularly their rights to housing, land, and property. What is concerning is that responsibility for misusing the term could fall on a donor entity, on purely humanitarian grounds. This presents a crucial opportunity to observe how donor organisations use technical language drawn from humanitarian work to impose politically motivated agendas – essentially turning these donors into entities seeking to fulfil political objectives.
“Early recovery” usually describes projects funded by donor organisations and implemented by governmental and non-governmental bodies, often in partnership with government agencies, in areas affected by war or natural disasters, during a transitional phase between initial humanitarian relief efforts and reconstruction or development. Early recovery is intended to serve as a bridge between these phases, incorporating mechanisms from both and adapting them into specialised programmes aimed at addressing a wide range of key issues. These span from livelihoods to sustainable development, passing through governance, resilience-building, restoring local capacities, and recovering basic services, while also addressing the long-term issues that led to the crisis. Therefore, in the language used by aid organisations, early recovery is a multidimensional process that starts at the final stages of humanitarian response and continues into the first steps of sustainable development.
Like many terms and concepts used in the language of aid work, “early recovery” does not have a clear-cut definition. Instead, its meaning depends on how it is employed and the objectives it seeks to achieve, or avoid. In all cases, early recovery exemplifies a politically charged concept, applied in a way that allows manoeuvring between several key actors: donors, governmental and non-governmental organisations, and political regimes or de facto forces controlling the ground.
This manoeuvring involves using a single term with multiple interpretations to express ambiguous ideas, while allowing for plausible deniability due to misunderstanding or a lack of precision. It is akin to speaking in a foreign language at a meeting where not everyone shares the same tongue, and providing inaccurate real-time translation, allowing each party to hear what they want. This unique language permits the expression of contradictory ideas without the burden of accountability. The problem is not merely linguistic. The term “early recovery” is one example of translating politically-favoured recommendations for policymakers into the execution-friendly language preferred by governmental and non-governmental organisations.
Thus, early recovery appears more like a space existing somewhere, but on the margins. It is neither a phase nor a process. It is neither relief nor development. It occupies a middle ground, exactly where those who need it want it to be. It is a label that can describe more than one thing at once – a key that opens multiple doors. This is not a negative critique but an attempt to strip the term of all the ideological baggage imposed on it by the actors involved, each according to their own interests. In this space, the three main parties – donors, aid organisations, and de facto powers – speak a language that is both understandable and practically implementable. Here, early recovery ceases to be merely a transitional stage from conflict to peace; it becomes a limited international humanitarian intervention in a crisis zone, made up of executable phases. What is striking is that the three parties involved in defining and redefining the term “early recovery” constantly distance themselves from any political suspicion surrounding their actions, eager to describe it as “merely a purely humanitarian process.”
Therefore, it is equally valid for the Syrian regime to claim that early recovery began at the end of the armed conflict, as it is for Syrian opposition groups to argue that early recovery should aim at peacebuilding and state-building. Likewise, organisations may claim that early recovery should focus on helping people on the ground, regardless of the powers controlling them, while donors insist that early recovery should not be politicised. Amidst these “valid” positions, many critical aspects remain unspoken, such as the need for a political solution, reconstruction, sustainable development, and governance models. Above all, there are issues of national accountability and responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, ensuring that perpetrators do not go unpunished, compensating victims and their families, and uncovering the fate of the missing.
Amidst the confusion surrounding terms like “early recovery” and their subjective interpretations, various definitions emerge from Syrian experts in the field. For example, early recovery has been described as “all humanitarian and developmental efforts undertaken by local and international actors to improve the economic and social conditions across the country, in addition to efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of institutions involved in improving these conditions.” Zaki Mehchy and Mohammed Al-Sattof, Impact of Early Recovery and Reconstruction Projects on HLP Rights in Syria, The Day After, 2024. Alternatively, it has been defined as “a late stage of humanitarian intervention, starting when major military operations decrease. It relies more on local communities and governance structures to plan, fund, and implement the process, with external support. Its primary goal is to stabilise local communities and enhance their adaptability through integrated projects, measured by effectiveness, impact, accountability, and transparency.” Ayman Al-Dessouki, The Early Recovery Fund… Hidden Opportunities and Existing Risks, Omran Center for Strategic Studies, May 2024. Early recovery lies between humanitarian response, which is driven by international donors with minimal oversight and a surplus of resources, and reconstruction, which is led by a government that centrally plans and negotiates with international donors to rebuild infrastructure, often involving substantial private sector investment within a stable political and security environment. In this context, early recovery becomes a national necessity that lays the groundwork for a political solution. Zaidoun Al-Zoubi, Alternatives to Early Recovery, Enab Baladi, June 2024. Others argue that the term “early recovery” should only be used during a period of stability, which is not the case in Syria. They believe that one of the key goals of early recovery is state-building, restoring its capacity for public administration and civil services, establishing mechanisms for oversight, accountability, and financial control, rebuilding representative political institutions, preventing a relapse into conflict, and most importantly, building peace. Osama Al-Qadi, Correcting Concepts… OCHA and Early Recovery! Syria TV, April 2021. Another perspective suggests that early recovery has been occurring over the past few years on the margins of humanitarian aid in various regions, in the form of politically driven projects such as governance, women’s empowerment, political development, and livelihood initiatives with an economic and developmental focus. These cannot be classified under humanitarian response or reconstruction. Zaidoun Al-Zoubi, Omar Abdulaziz Al-Hallaj, Ethical Principles for ‘Early Recovery’ in Syria, Awan, April 2024.
Since the end of the active phase of the armed conflict in 2018, donor organisations, particularly those linked to Western countries, have tied funding for reconstruction projects to the occurrence of political transition in Syria. However, the regime’s military victory, backed by Russia and Iran, has complicated the possibility of a political solution and limited the UN Special Envoy’s ability to make any meaningful progress in the Geneva negotiations between the opposition and the regime. This deadlock has affected the dynamics between donors, organisations, and the de facto authorities, including the regime. The humanitarian response phase to the disaster has ended, and there are no signs of reconstruction projects on the horizon. As a result, talk of early recovery has gradually escalated as an operational alternative that allows continued funding for humanitarian projects on the ground, as long as they do not cross the threshold into reconstruction. In essence, early recovery has become the technical solution to a political stalemate.
This shift from political action to procedural stalling raises questions about the clear distinctions between reconstruction and early recovery. One major difference is that reconstruction is led and planned by the state, while early recovery is planned by donors and organisations. Early recovery is also a form of humanitarian assistance that comes in the form of grants and does not require repayment, whereas reconstruction often comes in the form of loans. Sami Aqeel, Karam Shaar, The politics of early recovery aid in Syria. Is it actually reconstruction aid?, Atlantic Council, February 2022. To further clarify the distinction, it can be said that infrastructure rehabilitation, rebuilding and repairing damaged housing, and constructing new housing complexes are directly linked to reconstruction. Meanwhile, projects supporting healthcare, education, private sector development, job creation, and social cohesion are tied to early recovery. The Day After, Impact of Early Recovery and Reconstruction Projects on HLP Rights in Syria, previously cited.
The problem is that all these boundaries are fluid and not precisely defined, making it easy to cross from reconstruction to early recovery, or vice versa, without any real transition. In practice, these distinctions can dissolve entirely when political interests come into play. For example, in what seems like an alignment with Russia’s approach of using early recovery as a gateway to normalising relations with the regime in Damascus, a report published in July 2022 by UN-Habitat urged policymakers “to move beyond the usual divisions between humanitarian response, early recovery, reconstruction, and long-term development, and to support recovery wherever it can be achieved.” UN-Habitat, Recovery of Services and Infrastructure in Syria. “Not If, But How?” 2022. This suggests that the UN agency is “not only seeking to build a bridge between relief and reconstruction but also intends to blur the distinction between them.” Malek Al-Abda, Lars Hauch, Early Recovery Assistance in Syria: Balancing Political and Humanitarian Goals, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, April 2023.
In another case, in June 2023, the UN Secretary-General instructed the UN team in Syria to prepare a five-year early recovery programme and explore funding methods for it. It appears that the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Damascus independently drafted a concept note to establish an Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF) in coordination with the authorities in Damascus, without consulting donors or NGOs operating in Syria. The draft stated that the fund would serve as an additional mechanism to secure financing over five years, prioritising community resilience, health and nutrition, education, water and sanitation, livelihoods, and electricity. According to the draft, the fund would have a steering committee, a technical committee, and a secretariat based in Beirut. The resident coordinator and UN humanitarian coordinator in Syria would oversee the fund’s overall management, consulting with donors and participating organisations. The initial funding target was set at USD 500 million, spread over five years. This draft raised concerns among NGOs working outside regime-controlled areas, prompting the Syria International NGO Regional Forum (SIRF), representing 65 organisations across Syria, to submit recommendations. The forum expressed deep concerns over the proposed governance structure of the early recovery fund and insisted that the chair of the steering committee should, indeed, be located outside Damascus and that the fund should adopt a comprehensive approach across all of Syria. This would ensure the fund’s neutrality and impartiality, guaranteeing the strategic distribution of resources across all response areas and promoting inclusivity and fair decision-making.
This political dispute over the interpretation of the term and the limits of its independence from the interests of those who invoke it reveals much, yet remains confusing. A few practical examples can help illuminate aspects of this chaos. In October 2023, the Damascus governorate launched a project called “Participatory Planning for the Early Recovery of Old Damascus,” in cooperation with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Syria. According to those involved, the process is “participatory,” integrating the governorate’s efforts with the local community to develop an early recovery plan that includes strengthening the capacities of neighbourhood committees, volunteer groups, and individuals, enhancing dialogue between local authorities in the Old City and the community, encouraging community participation, supporting grassroots initiatives, expanding the involvement of youth and women in local decision-making, and promoting corporate social responsibility by engaging the private sector in dialogue and action. The area is already suffering from deteriorating services and delays in the renovation and repair of old buildings, which pose structural safety risks. However, one of the initial observations about this early recovery project is that the Old City of Damascus did not suffer direct damage from wartime fighting. Its problems are more technical, related to unregistered inherited common owned properties and overlapping authorities among different governmental entities. The Syria Report, U.N. Agencies Involved in Sensitive Early Recovery Project in Old Damascus, December 2023. This raises the question of which areas are most in need of early recovery projects – should it prioritise those that were not directly affected by the conflict or those that were devastated? This dilemma stems from the challenge of proving and documenting rights. In destroyed areas, proving ownership is difficult, as more than half of Syria’s properties are not registered in the official Land Registry. Meanwhile, in areas unaffected by the war, the existence of standing buildings provides physical evidence of property rights. Therefore, before addressing these issues, it is essential to establish real mechanisms for risk assessment, which do not rely on traditional tools such as laws and records. What is documented in the Land Registry and codified in Syrian law is one thing, but the people’s rights, livelihoods, hard work, and personal stories are quite another matter. Mazen Ezzi, The Right to Slums: In Defence of ‘Building Violations’ in Syria, Al-Jumhuriya, November 2023.
In another example, in 2019, a project funded by the UNDP, supported by the Syria Trust for Development and the Aleppo City Council, and implemented by the Spanish organisation Rescate, was carried out in the Ramouseh area of Aleppo. The project involved collecting, crushing, and sorting debris to extract materials that could be used to manufacture concrete bricks for construction. The experiment was successful and turned into a project producing 8,000 concrete bricks, with donors providing the necessary machinery and equipment, which would later be handed over to the Aleppo City Council once the project was completed. This successful trial seems to have led to a similar experiment being launched in Deir-ez-Zor, under the sponsorship of international organisations. However, the most important issue in the project – the ownership of the debris and the rights of its owners to compensation – was not addressed. The Syria Report, Government Approaches Rubble Recycling as Merely Technical Issue, December 2022.
In the town of Al-Hajar Al-Aswad in the Damascus countryside, Syrian authorities are seeking funding from donors for projects classified under early recovery to rehabilitate schools, restore water, electricity, and sewage networks, and remove debris. The Rural Damascus Governorate has linked the return of displaced residents to the town with the rehabilitation of its infrastructure, placing pressure on organisations and donors. The city council has already signed an agreement with Première Urgence Internationale, an NGO, to fund the rehabilitation of a school, while UNICEF has equipped another school. The International Red Cross has implemented a project to repair and replace a sewage line. Additionally, ADRA, another NGO, has committed to rehabilitating schools and installing a solar power system to operate two water wells, as well as removing debris, although the locations and methods of debris removal, and under which legal framework it will be carried out, have not been clarified. Despite all these efforts, the Rural Damascus Governorate still restricts the return of displaced residents to the town, requiring them to obtain prior security clearance. The Syria Report, Early Recovery Projects in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad, August 2022.
Similarly, in June 2022, the Aleppo City Council began implementing a recovery plan in several neighbourhoods in eastern Aleppo, under the supervision of a UN programme in cooperation with the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment. The plan includes rehabilitating some parks, maintaining sewage and drinking water networks, replacing damaged benches, and extending a solar-powered lighting system. It also involves restoring basic services, repairing sewage and drinking water systems, fixing roads, removing some debris in the Al-Qadi Askar area, and clearing both main and secondary roads of barriers and concrete blocks. Besides the issue of debris, which raises concerns, several Syrian NGOs, organisations affiliated with the Baath Party, and Iran-aligned militias were involved in implementing this plan. The Aleppo Defenders Corps, a component of the Syrian Hezbollah militia network that participated in the military assaults on the city when it was under opposition control, contributed to the plan by involving its personnel, machinery, and engineering equipment in the removal of debris, garbage, and road clearing. The Syria Report, Recovery Plan in Hard-hit East Aleppo District Sees Involvement from Pro-Regime Militia, June 2022.
Recently, the political debate has taken a new direction, with a clear voice emerging among some donors, stating that the political process has failed and that the regime will not negotiate any political concessions. Zaidoun Al-Zoubi, Omar Abdulaziz Al-Hallaj, Ethical Principles for Early Recovery in Syria, previously cited. Therefore, they question whether it wouldn’t be more effective to help the Syrians by expanding the concept of early recovery to include additional sectors, such as reviving agriculture and essential services. This would include renewable energy services, drinking water, wastewater management, waste management, and revitalising small businesses. Dardari to Al-Majalla: Our World is Full of Crises… and Our Region Recognises Its Fragility, Al-Majalla, August 2023. This voice, genuinely concerned with focusing on the victims and trying to ensure they receive a share of the funding for early recovery projects, is currently being led by the office of Abdallah Dardari, the UN Assistant Secretary-General and Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab States at the UNDP, and Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs from 2005 to 2011. Assuming good intentions, Dardari’s approach, under the banner of defending Syrians, involves facilitating the launch of limited reconstruction projects supported by international organisations, under the name of early recovery. These projects would provide financial liquidity without proper oversight in an environment rife with businessmen and companies listed on international sanctions lists, many of whom are accused of participating in or facilitating crimes against Syrians. Firas Faham, Early Recovery: The Syrian Regime’s Gateway to Controlling Aid, Al Jazeera, May 2024. Any assessment of the risks of funding these projects must involve neutral parties capable of assessing and monitoring the sensitivities of the conflict.
At first glance, this approach might seem like a pragmatic procedural solution, given the deadlock in the political process. However, from another perspective, it allows the funding of limited infrastructure projects without linking them to any political change. In effect, it lets the regime off the hook in terms of governance reforms and absolves donors of moral responsibility for the deteriorating conditions of Syrians, as they fail to impose a political solution. This approach is reminiscent of the Tenth Five-Year Plan 2005-2010, which Mr Dardari, then Syria’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, formulated as an economic liberalisation programme led by a class of Syrian businessmen. The plan did not include any political reform or approaches and was adopted by the Tenth Congress of the Baath Party under the guise of “social market economy.” This policy is widely regarded as one of the causes of the poverty and marginalisation that afflicted Syrians and contributed to the 2011 revolution. Mohammad Jamal Barout, “The Last Decade in Syria’s History: The Dialectic of Stagnation and Reform, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, 2012, pp. 21-51.
Today, the same non-political solution for a crisis stemming from political deadlock is being reattempted, under the same justifications: the desire to safeguard the lives of Syrians and alleviate their suffering. These justifications are sound, ethical, and realistic, but the issue lies in the proposed solution to the crisis causing this suffering: a politically neutral, middle-ground solution under the name of early recovery.
